We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of the distinguished people. We investigate how a set of natural parameters, namely the maximum length of preference lists for men and women, the number of distinguished men and women, and the number of blocking pairs allowed determine the computational tractability of this problem. Our main result is a complete complexity trichotomy that, for each choice of the studied parameters, classifies SMC as polynomial-time solvable, NP-hard and fixed-parameter tractable, or NP-hard and W[1]-hard. We also classify all cases of one-sided constraints where only women may be distinguished.
Introduction
The Stable Marriage (SM) problem is a fundamental problem first studied by Gale and Shapley [18] in 1962. An instance of SM consists of a set M of men, a set W of women, and a preference list for each person ordering members of the opposite sex. We aim to find a stable matching, i.e., a matching for which there exists no pair of a man and a woman who prefer each other to their partners given by the matching; such a pair is called a blocking pair.
We consider a problem that we call Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC). Here, a set W ⋆ of women and a set M ⋆ of men are distinguished, and a feasible matching is one where each person in W ⋆ ∪ M ⋆ gets matched. By the Rural Hospitals Theorem [19] we know that the set of unmatched men and women is the same in all stable matchings, so clearly, feasible stable matchings may not exist. Thus, we define the task in SMC as finding a feasible matching with a minimum number of blocking pairs. Somewhat surprisingly, this natural extension of SM has not been considered before.
Motivation
Our main motivation for studying SMC-apart from its natural definition-is its close relationship with the Hospitals/Residents with Lower Quota (HRLQ) problem, modelling a situation where medical residents apply for jobs in hospitals: residents rank hospitals and vice versa, and hospitals declare both lower and upper quotas which bound the number of residents they can accept; the task is to find an assignment with a minimum number of blocking pairs. By the frequently applied method of "cloning" hospitals, HRLQ reduces to the case where each hospital has unit upper quota. In fact, this is equivalent to the special case of SMC where only women (or, equivalently, men) are distinguished. We refer to this problem with one-sided covering constraints, linking SMC and HRLQ, as SMC-1.
The HRLQ problem and its variants have recently gained quite some interest from the algorithmic community [4, 7, 15, 21, 23, 25, 29, 36, 40] . In his book, Manlove [33, Chapter 5.2] devotes an entire chapter to the algorithmics of different versions of the HRLQ problem.
The reason for this interest in HRLQ is explained by its importance in several real-world matching markets [16, 17, 38] such as school admission systems, centralized assignment of residents to hospitals, or of cadets to military branches. Lower quotas are a common feature of such admission systems. Their purpose is often to remedy the effects of understaffing that are explained by the well-known Rural Hospitals Theorem [19] : as an example, governments usually want to assign at least a small number of medical residents to each rural hospital to guarantee a minimum service level. Minimum quotas are also discussed in controlled school choice programs [12, 32, 39] where students are divided into a small number of types, and schools set lower bounds for each type. Such models can represent various forms of affirmative actions taken by schools to, e.g., admit a certain number of minority students [12] . Another example is the German university admission system for admitting students to highly oversubscribed subjects, where a certain percentage of study places is assigned according to high school grades or waiting time [39] . But lower quotas may also arise due to financial considerations: for instance, a business course with too few (tuition-paying) attendees may not be profitable. Certain aspects of airline preferences for seat upgrade allocations can be also modelled by lower quotas [32] .
Another motivation for studying the SMC problem comes from the following scenario that we dub Control for Stable Marriage. Consider a two-sided market where each participant of the market expresses its preferences over members of the other party, and some central agent (e.g., a government) performs the task of finding a stable matching in the market. It might happen that this central agency wishes to apply a certain control on the stable matching produced: it may favour some participants by trying to assign them a partner in the resulting matching. Such a behaviour might be either malicious (e.g., the central agency may accept bribes and thus favour certain participants) or beneficial (e.g., it may favour those who are at disadvantage, like handicapped or minority participants). However, there might not be a stable matching that covers all participants the agency wants to favour; thus arises the need to produce a matching that is as stable as possible among those that fulfil our constraints-the most natural aim in such a case is to minimize the number of blocking pairs in the produced matching, which yields exactly the SMC problem. Similar control problems for voting systems have been extensively studied in the area of social choice following the work initiated by Bartholdi III. et al. [3] , but have not yet been considered in connection to stable matchings.
Our Results
We provide an extensive algorithmic analysis of the SMC problem and its special case SMC-1. In our analysis, we examine how different aspects of the input influence the tractability of these problems. To this end, we apply the framework of parameterized complexity, which deals with computationally hard problems and focuses on how certain parameters of a problem instance influence its tractability; for background, we refer to the book by Cygan et al. [10] . We aim to design so-called fixed-parameter algorithms, which perform well in practice if the value of the parameter on hand is small (for the precise definitions, see Sect. 2).
The parameters we consider are
• the number b of blocking pairs allowed,
• the number |W ⋆ | of women with covering constraint,
• the number |M ⋆ | of men with covering constraint,
• the maximum length ∆ W of women's preference lists, and
• the maximum length ∆ M of men's preference lists.
The choice of each of these parameters is motivated by the aforementioned applications. For instance, we seek matchings where ideally no blocking pairs at all or at least only few of them appear, to ensure stability of the matching and happiness of those getting matched. The number of women/men with covering constraints corresponds, for instance, to the number of rural hospitals for which a minimum quota specifically must be enforced, which we can expect to be small among the set of all hospitals accepting medical residents. Finally, preference lists of hospitals and residents can be expected to be small, as each hospital might not rank many more candidates than the number of positions it has to fill, whereas residents might rank only their top choices of hospitals. We investigate in detail how these parameters influence the complexity of the SMC problem. A parameterized restriction of SMC with respect to the set S = {b, |W ⋆ |, |M ⋆ |, ∆ M , ∆ W } means a (possibly parameterized) special case of SMC where each element of S is either restricted to be some constant integer, or regarded as a parameter, or left unbounded. Intuitively, these different choices for the elements of S correspond to their expected "range" in applications, from very small to mid-range to large (compared to the size of the entire system). By considering all combinations, we can flexibly model the whole range of applications mentioned above. Theorem 1. Any parameterized restriction of SMC with respect to {b, |W ⋆ |, |M ⋆ |, ∆ M , ∆ W } is in P, or NP-hard and fixed-parameter tractable, or NP-hard and W [1] -hard with the given parameterization 1 , and is covered by one of the results shown in Table 1 .
In particular, SMC is W[1]-hard parameterized by b+|W ⋆ |, even if there are no distinguished men (i.e., |M ⋆ | = 0), there is a master list over men as well as one over women, ∆ M = 3, ∆ W = 3 and each distinguished woman finds only a single man acceptable.
A decision diagram in Section 7 shows that the presented results indeed cover all restrictions of SMC with respect to the set {b, |W ⋆ |, |M ⋆ |, ∆ M , ∆ W }. Table 1 summarizes our results on the complexity of SMC. Note that some results are implied directly by the symmetrical roles of men and women in SMC, and thus are not stated explicitly.
As a special case, we answer a question by Hamada et al. [23] who gave an exponential-time algorithm that in time O(|I| b+1 ) decides for a given instance I of HRLQ whether it admits a feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs 2 ; the authors asked whether HRLQ is fixedparameter tractable parameterized by b. As shown by Theorem 1, SMC-1 and therefore also HRLQ is W[1]-hard when parameterized by b, already in a very restricted setting. Thus, the answer to the question by Hamada et al. [23] is negative: SMC-1, and hence HRLQ, admits no fixed-parameter algorithm with parameter b unless FPT = W[1].
Related Work
There is a dynamically growing literature on matching markets with lower quotas [4, 7, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 25, 29, 36, 40] . These papers study several variants of HRLQ, adapting the general model to the various specialties of practical problems. However, there are only a few papers which consider the problem of minimizing the number of blocking pairs [16, 23] . The most closely related work to ours is the paper by Hamada et al. [23] : they prove that the HRLQ problem is NP-hard and give strong inapproximability results; they also consider the SMC-1 problem directly and propose an O(|I| b+1 ) time algorithm for it.
A different line of research connected to SMC is the problem of arranged marriages, an early extension of SM suggested by Knuth [30] in 1976. Here, a set Q ⋆ of man-woman pairs is distinguished, and we seek a stable matching that contains Q ⋆ as a subset. Thus, as opposed to SMC, we not only require that each distinguished person is assigned some partner, but instead prescribe its partner exactly. Initial work on arranged marriages [22, 30] was extended by Dias et al. [11] to consider also forbidden marriages, and was further generalized by Fleiner et al. [14] and Cseh and Manlove [9] . Despite the similar flavour of the studied problems, none of these papers have a direct consequence on the complexity of SMC.
Our work also fits into the line of research that addresses computationally hard problems in the area of stable matchings by focusing on instances with bounded preference lists [6, 26, 28, 31, 37] or by applying the more flexible approach of parameterized complexity [1, 2, 5, 34, 35] .
Organization. After the preliminaries in Sect. 2, we start with the main intractability result in Sect. 3, which answers Hamada et al.'s question. This result shows W[1]-hardness of SMC parameterized by b + |W ⋆ | even when M ⋆ = ∅ and ∆ M = ∆ W = 3. Thus, we explore three directions to achieve tractability: (i) to lower b to be a constant, (ii) to lower |W ⋆ | to be a constant, or (iii) to lower either ∆ W or ∆ M to 2. We cover the cases (i) and (ii) in Sect. 5, and case (iii) in Sect. 6. In addition, Sect. 4 provides polynomial-time approximation results for HRLQ and SMC, used also in the polynomial-time algorithms of Sect. 5.
Preliminaries
An instance I of the Stable Marriage (SM) problem consists of a set M of men and a set W of women. Each person x ∈ M ∪ W has a preference list L(x) that strictly orders the members of the other party acceptable for x. We thus write L(x) as a vector L(x) = (y 1 , . . . , y t ), denoting that y i is (strictly) preferred by x over y j for each i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ t. A matching M for I is a set of man-woman pairs appearing in each other's preference lists such that each person is contained in at most one pair of M ; some persons may be left unmatched by M . For each person x we denote by M (x) the person assigned by M to x. For a matching M , a man m and a woman w included in each other's preference lists form a blocking pair if (i) m is either unmatched or prefers w to M (m), and (ii) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M (w). In the Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC) problem, we are given additional subsets W ⋆ ⊆ W and M ⋆ ⊆ M of distinguished people that must be matched; a matching M is feasible if it matches everybody in W ⋆ ∪ M ⋆ . The objective of SMC is to find a feasible matching for I with minimum number of blocking pairs. If only people from one gender are distinguished, then without loss of generality, we assume these to be women; this special case will be denoted by SMC-1.
The many-to-one extension of SMC-1 is the Hospitals/Residents with Lower Quotas (HRLQ) problem whose input consists of a set R of residents and a set H of hospitals that have ordered preferences over the acceptable members of the other party. Each hospital h ∈ H has a quota lower bound q(h) and a quota upper bound q(h), which bound the number of residents that can be assigned to h from below and above. One seeks an assignment M that maps a subset of the residents to hospitals that respects acceptability and is feasible, that is, q(h) ≤ |M (h)| ≤ q(h) for each hospital h. Here, M (h) is the set of residents assigned to some h ∈ H by M . We say that a hospital h is under-subscribed if |M (h)| < q(h). For an assignment M of an instance of HRLQ, a pair {r, h} of a resident r and a hospital h is blocking if (i) r is unassigned or prefers h to the hospital assigned to r by M , and (ii) h is undersubscribed or prefers r to one of the residents in M (h). The task in HRLQ is to find a feasible assignment with minimum number of blocking pairs.
Some instances of SMC may admit a master list over women, which is a total ordering L W of all women, such that for each man m ∈ M, the preference list L(m) is the restriction of L W to those women that m finds acceptable. Similarly, we consider master lists over men.
With each instance I of SMC (or HRLQ) we can naturally associate a bipartite graph G I whose vertex partitions correspond to M and W (or R and H, respectively), and there is an edge between a man m ∈ M and a woman w ∈ W (or between a resident r ∈ R and a hospital h ∈ H, respectively) if they appear in each other's preference lists. We may refer to entities of I as vertices, or a pair of entities as edges, without mentioning G I explicitly.
Parameterized complexity. The framework of parameterized complexity deals with computationally hard problems, examining their complexity in a more detailed way than classical complexity theory. In a parameterized problem problem Π, each input instance I is associated with an integer k called the parameter. An algorithm which decides instances I of Π in time f (k) · |I| O(1) for some computable function f is called a fixed-parameter algorithm. Note that the dependence of the polynomial in the run time is constant, but the dependence on the parameter k can be arbitrary (and is typically exponential). However, if the parameter of a given instance is small, then such an algorithm can be useful in practice even if the overall size of the instance is large.
The class of problems admitting fixed-parameter algorithms is denoted by FPT. To argue that a problem is not in FPT, parameterized complexity provides a hardness theory. For two parameterized problems Π 1 and Π 2 , a parameterized reduction from Π 1 to Π 2 is a function f , computable by a fixed-parameter algorithm, that maps each instance (I 1 , k 1 ) of Π 1 to an instance f (I 1 , k 1 ) = (I 2 , k 2 ) of Π 2 such that (i) (I 1 , k 1 ) is a "yes"-instance of Π 1 if and only if (I 2 , k 2 ) is a "yes"-instance of Π 2 , and (ii) k 2 ≤ g(k 2 ) for some function g. The basic class of parameterized intractability is W [1] : proving a problem Π to be W[1]-hard is strong evidence that Π / ∈ FPT.
Given some problem Π that is known to be W [13] . Let G be the input graph, with its vertex set partitioned into k sets V 1 , . . . , V k ; the task is to find a clique of size k in G containing exactly one vertex from each of the sets V i . We let E i,j denote those edges that run between V i and V j for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k.
We fix an ordering on the vertices and edges of G that places vertices of V i before vertices of V j whenever i < j. We will write succ(x) to denote the vertex following x in this ordering, and we let v 1 i and v ∞ i denote the first and last vertices in V i , respectively. Similarly, we write succ({x, y}) for the edge following {x, y}, and we let e 1 i,j and e ∞ i,j denote the first and last edges in E i,j , respectively. We will also write pred(x) and pred({x, y}) for the predecessor of x or {x, y}, respectively. Also, we denote the h-th neighbor of some vertex x as n(x, h). For simplicity, we assume that there is no isolated vertex in G.
We construct an instance I of SMC as follows; see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for an illustration. We set the number of blocking pairs allowed for I to be b = 2k + k 2 . Together with the instance I, we will define a stable matching M s for I as well, and for each woman w of I, we will denote the man M s (w) byŵ. Some women will need "dummy" partners in their preference lists: we denote the dummy of w by w. The dummy w will always appear as the last item on w's preference list, and its preference list will always be L( w) = (w).
For each i and j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we construct an edge selecting gadget G i,j that involves women s i,j and t i,j , together with women a {x,y} , b x→y , and b y→x for each edge {x, y} ∈ E i,j . All women in G i,j are matched by M s except for s i,j , and G i,j contains the manŵ for each of these women w, together with additional dummies b y→x for each {x, y} ∈ E i,j with x preceding y.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we also construct a node selecting gadget G i involving women s i , t i , and u 1 i , . . . , u for each x ∈ V i . We define the following sets of women:
To define the set W ⋆ of women in I with covering constraint we let
The finish the definition of I, we define the precise structure of these gadgets as well as the connections between them by the preference lists shown in Tables 2 and 3 ; when not stated otherwise, indices take all possible values.
For simplicity, we write b 0
for any vertex x ∈ V (G). . . . . . . . . . 
= (w), for any dummy woman w. L(a {x,y} ) = (â succ({x,y}) ,â {x,y} ,b x→y ), where {x, y} ∈ E i,j \ {e ∞ i,j , } and x precedes y, L(a {x,y} ) = (t i,j ,â {x,y} ,b x→y ), where {x, y} = e ∞ i,j and x precedes y,
where y = n(x, h) and x precedes y in V (G),
where
= (w), for any dummy woman w.
Let us define a master list L W over all women as follows. The first women in L W are those in T , in any ordering. They are followed by women in A, ordered according to the reversed ordering over V (G), that is, a x precedes a y exactly if y precedes x. Next follow women of A ′ , ordered according to the reversed ordering over E(G). Next come women in B ∪ B ′ . To order them, we first order those in B by putting b h x before b ℓ y in L W if and only if x precedes y or x = y and h < ℓ, then for each edge {x, y} ∈ E(G) with x preceding y, y = n(x, h) and x = n(y, ℓ) we insert b x→y just before b h x , and we insert b y→x just before b ℓ y , thus determining the ordering of B ∪ B ′ . After women in B ∪ B ′ come women of C, with c h x preceding c ℓ y exactly if h < ℓ or h = ℓ and x precedes y. We finish the definition of the master list L W by putting all women in S ∪ U at the end of L W in an arbitrary order.
The master list over men is derived from L W by lettingŵ 1 precedeŵ 2 whenever w 1 precedes w 2 in L W , and adding all dummies at the end in an arbitrary order. It is easy to check that the preference lists given in Tables 2 and 3 are indeed compatible with these master lists. This completes the construction of the instance.
We are going to prove that the constructed instance I admits a feasible assignment with at most b blocking pairs if and only if there is a clique of size k in the graph G.
"⇒": Suppose there is a feasible matching M of men to women with at most b blocking pairs. Let G ∆ be the symmetric difference M △M s . Notice that for each woman s ∈ S, the difference G ∆ must contain exactly one path containing s as its endpoint, since the women in S must be matched in M , but are unmatched in M s . Similarly, no path of G ∆ can contain a woman in T ∪ U . We call a path P in G ∆ with an endpoint s in S an augmenting path. We say that P starts at s and ends at its other endpoint, and we refer to that path starting at s i (or s i,j ) as P i (or P i,j , respectively).
We define the cost of some path P of G ∆ as the number of blocking pairs {m, w} for M involving a woman w that appears on P . Since M s is stable, it should be clear that each augmenting path contains at least one edge that is blocking for M , so each path in G ∆ has cost at least 1. As there are exactly k + k 2 augmenting paths (as all women in S must be matched by M ), we get a minimum cost of k + k 2 . Note also that the total cost of all paths in G ∆ cannot exceed b = 2k + k 2 . Claim 1 is therefore crucial. Claim 1. The following holds for any augmenting path P of G ∆ :
• P cannot end at a dummy c b+1 x for some x ∈ V (G).
• P contains an edge {a,â} for some a ∈ A ∪ A ′ that blocks M .
• If P is not disjoint from G i for some i, then P has cost at least 2.
Proof of Claim 1. To prove (a), suppose for contradiction that P ends at c b+1 x , where x ∈ V i . Clearly, P must contain at least one woman from each of the b + 1 sets
Fix h, and let us consider the last v ∈ V i for which c h v is incident to an edge of
Then the edge {c h v , w} yields a blocking pair in M , as M (w) = M s (w) =ŵ, and thusŵ prefers c h v to w. This reasoning gives us b + 1 different blocking pairs for M , one for each index h, contradicting our assumption on M .
To prove (b), let us consider the case when P = P i for some i; the argument goes the same way for the case where P = P i,j for some i and j. If P ends at a x for some x ∈ V i , then a x forms a blocking pair withâ x in M . If P does not end at a woman in A, then it must contain the edge {a x , b 1
x } for some x, in which case {a x ,â x } is again blocking in M , showing (b). To see (c), first observe that if P is not disjoint from G i , then P ends in G i , simply because of its property that it contains edges from M and M s in an alternating fashion. Therefore, the last woman w on P must be in
x cannot be on P , as that would imply that b h+1 x is on P , contradicting the choice of w). If, by contrast, w = c for some c ∈ C, then P must end at w by (a), and then c forms a blocking pair with the third man in its preference list (for whom c is the first choice). In either case, w is involved in a blocking pair, which together with the blocking pair guaranteed by (b) implies that P has cost at least 2. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 1 proves that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} the augmenting path P i has cost at least 2. Since all the remaining k 2 augmenting paths have cost at least 1, and the total cost of these paths must be at most b = 2k + k 2 , we get that any path P i (or P i,j ) must have cost exactly 2 (or 1, respectively). Furthermore, it also follows that no other path of G ∆ can enter or start in G i , for any i, as that would imply that the number of blocking pairs for M is more than b. In addition, it is not hard to see that G ∆ does not contain any cycle, because all cycles in the graph underlying I contain two consecutive edges not in M s . Hence, it follows that the only connected component in G ∆ that is not disjoint from G i is P i .
To deal with the possibly courses the path P i may take for some i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, let x i denote the vertex in V i for which {a x i ,â x i } is the blocking edge guaranteed by statement (b) of Claim 1. Observe that P i either ends at a x i or contains the edge {a
In either case, we say that P i selects x i from V i ; clearly, there can be only one vertex in V i selected by P i .
Consider now P i,j for some 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k. Recall that P i,j has cost 1. Therefore, statement (b) of Claim 1 proves that the only blocking edge incident to some woman on P i,j must be {a {x,y} ,â {x,y} } for some {x, y} ∈ E i,j . We say that P i,j selects the edge {x, y}; without loss of generality, let us assume that x precedes y. By statement (c) of Claim 1, we also know that P i,j cannot leave G i,j , which means that it can only have cost 1 if it ends at b y→x . In particular, it contains the edges {b x→y ,b y→x } and {b y→x , b y→x }. Observe that the edge {b x→y ,b h x } where h is such that y = n(x, h) cannot be blocking in M (as this would indicate a cost of 2 for P i,j ), yielding thatb h x must be matched to b h−1 x in M . By the arguments of the previous paragraph, this means that P i must contain the subpath (a x ,b 1
. Hence, we obtain that x must be selected by P i . Similarly, from the fact that the edge {b y→x ,b ℓ y } where x = n(y, ℓ) is not blocking in M we get that y must be selected by P j .
Thus, we obtain that if an edge is selected by P i,j for some i and j, then its endpoints must be selected by P i and P j . As this must hold for each pair of indices with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, we obtain that there must be k 2 edges in G whose endpoints are among the k selected vertices. This can only happen if these edges are the edges of a clique of size k.
"⇐": Suppose now that G has a clique of size k formed by the vertices x 1 , . . . , x k , with x i ∈ V i for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Instead of directly defining the required matching M that is feasible and admits at most b blocking pairs, we give M s △M as the union of paths P i for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and paths P i,j for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, defined as follows.
We set P i as the path
Similarly, we define
It is straightforward to verify that the blocking pairs for M are then the k edges {a
, c 1 x i }, and the
The feasibility of M is trivial; this completes the proof of Theorem 2.
A fundamental hypothesis about the complexity of NP-hard problems is the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH), which stipulates that algorithms solving all Satisfiability instances in subexponential time cannot exist [27] . Assuming ETH, the fundamental Clique problem parameterized by solution size k was shown not to admit any algorithm giving the correct answer in time f (k) · n o(k) for all n-vertex instances and any computable function f [8, Thm. 5.4]. The known reduction from Clique to Multicolored Clique does not change the parameter [13] . Finally, in the proof of Theorem 2, an instance of Multicolored Clique with solution size k is reduced to an instance of SMC-1 with parameter b = O(k 2 ).
for any computable function f ′ , even if there is a master list over men and over women, all preference lists have length at most 3, and each woman in W ⋆ finds only a single man acceptable.
Polynomial-Time Approximation
Here we first provide a polynomial-time algorithm that yields a (∆ R −1)q Σ -factor approximation for HRLQ. Then we use this result to propose a polynomial-time algorithm for HRLQ for the case where both the maximum length ∆ R of residents' preference lists and the total sum q Σ of all lower quotas is constant. Recall that in HRLQ, our objective is to find an assignment that satisfies all quota lower and upper bounds and minimizes the number of blocking pairs.
Theorem 3. Let I be an instance I of HRLQ, and q Σ the sum of lower quota bounds taken over all hospitals in I. There is an algorithm that in polynomial time either outputs a feasible assignment for I with at most (∆ R − 1)q Σ blocking pairs, involving only q Σ residents, or concludes that no feasible assignment exists.
Proof. We start by finding an assignment M q that assigns q(h) residents to each hospital h ∈ H ⋆ , and has the following property: for each hospital h ∈ H ⋆ , all residents that are preferred by h to the least preferred
Such an assignment can be obtained as follows. We start from an arbitrary assignment M that assigns q(h) residents to each h ∈ H ⋆ (if no such assignment exists, then we can stop and reject); such an assignment, if existent, can be found in polynomial time by an algorithm of Hopcroft and Karp [24] . Then we greedily re-assign residents to hospitals of H ⋆ , one-by-one: at each step, we take a hospital h ∈ H ⋆ , and if there exists a resident r not assigned to any other hospital in H ⋆ that h prefers to the least preferred resident r ′ in M (h), then we replace r ′ with r in M (h). If this step cannot be applied anymore, then we arrive at an assignment M q with the desired property ( †). Given M q , we reduce the upper quotas of each hospital h ∈ H ⋆ by q(h), set all lower quotas to 0, and delete all residents in R ⋆ := M q (H ⋆ ). We then find a stable assignment M s in the resulting instance I ′ ; note that I ′ is an instance of HR, so we can find M s in polynomial time [18] . Finally, we output M out = M s ∪M q . Clearly, M out is feasible. Also, any blocking pair that M out admits must involve either a hospital from H ⋆ or a resident from R ⋆ = M q (H ⋆ ) by the stability of M s with respect to I ′ . Observe that if some h ∈ H ⋆ is involved in some blocking pair {r, h} of M out , then we must have r ∈ R ⋆ . To see this, recall that each resident that is preferred by h to its least preferred resident in M q (h) must be in R ⋆ because of property ( †), and furthermore, h is under-subscribed in M out (within I) if and only if h is under-subscribed in M s (within I ′ ). Therefore, we can conclude that each blocking pair for M out must involve some resident in R ⋆ ; recall |R ⋆ | ≤ q(h). Since each resident in R ⋆ is incident to at most ∆ R − 1 edges not in M out , we also have that M out admits at most (∆ R −1)|R ⋆ | ≤ (∆ R −1)q(h) blocking pairs.
If both ∆ R and q Σ are constant, then Theorem 3 implies that HRLQ becomes polynomialtime solvable. Indeed, we can use the following simple strategy, depending on the number b of blocking pairs allowed: if b ≥ (∆ R − 1)q Σ , then we apply Theorem 3 directly; if b < (∆ R − 1)q Σ , then we use the algorithm by Hamada et al. [23] running in time O(|I| b+1 ) which is polynomial, since b is upper-bounded by a constant.
Corollary 2. If both the maximum length ∆ R of residents' preference lists and the total sum q Σ of all lower quotas is constant, then HRLQ is polynomial-time solvable.
Another application of Theorem 3 is an approximation algorithm that works regardless of whether ∆ R or q Σ is a constant. In fact, the algorithm of Theorem 3 can be turned into a (∆ R − 1)q Σ -factor approximation algorithm as follows. First, we find a stable assignment M s for I in polynomial time using the extension of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Hospitals/Residents problem. If M s is not feasible, then by the Rural Hospitals Theorem [19] , we know that any feasible assignment for I must admit at least one blocking pair; hence, the algorithm presented in Theorem 3 clearly yields an approximation with (multiplicative and also additive) factor (∆ R − 1)q Σ .
To close this section, we also state an analogue of Theorem 3 that deals with SMC: it can handle covering constraints on both sides, but assumes that all quota upper bounds are 1.
Theorem 4.
There is an algorithm that in polynomial time either outputs a feasible matching for an instance I of SMC with at most (∆ W −1)|M ⋆ |+(∆ M −1)|W ⋆ | blocking pairs, or concludes that no feasible matching exists for I.
Proof. We start by finding an arbitrary matching M that covers each distinguished person (if no such matching exists, then we can stop and reject); such a matching, if existent, can be found in polynomial time by standard flow techniques. We assume, without loss of generality, that each edge in M is incident to some distinguished person. Let us define X ⋆ = W ⋆ ∪ M ⋆ , and let U ⋆ be the set of those persons x ∈ X ⋆ whose partner M (x) is also in X ⋆ .
We proceed by modifying M into a matching M q that covers X ⋆ and has the following property:
If a person x ∈ X ⋆ \ U ⋆ belongs to a blocking pair {x, y} for M q , then M q (y) ∈ X ⋆ .
( ) Such an assignment can be obtained as follows. We greedily re-assign partners to the men and women in X ⋆ \ U ⋆ , one-by-one: at each step, we take a person x ∈ X ⋆ \ U ⋆ , and if x forms a blocking pair (with respect to the current matching) with some y that is not the partner of a distinguished person, then we replace the partner of x with y: we add the edge {x, y} to the matching, and delete all the other edges incident to x or y. Observe that the obtained matching is still feasible. If this step cannot be applied anymore, then we arrive at a matching M q with the desired property ( ); note also that each edge in M q is incident to some distinguished person. Given M q , we delete all men and women covered by M q . We then find a stable matching M s in the resulting instance I ′ ; note that I ′ is an instance of Stable Marriage, so we can find M s in polynomial time [18] . Finally, we output M out = M s ∪ M q . Clearly, M out is feasible. Also, any blocking pair that M out admits must involve a person covered by M q due to the stability of M s with respect to I ′ .
We claim that any blocking pair {x, y} involves a person whose partner by M q is distinguished, so either M q (x) ∈ X ⋆ or M q (y) ∈ X ⋆ . We can assume that x is covered by M q (because this holds for at least one of x and y). To see the claim, first note that if x is not distinguished, then M q (x) must be distinguished, because each edge of M q contains a distinguished person. Second, if x ∈ X ⋆ , then either x ∈ U ⋆ (in which case M q (x) ∈ X ⋆ ) or M q (y) ∈ X ⋆ because of property ( ). Therefore, we can conclude that each blocking pair for M out must involve the partner of some distinguished resident. The partners of distinguished women can be incident to at most |W ⋆ |(∆ M − 1) blocking pairs, and similarly, the partners of distinguished men can be incident to at most |M ⋆ |(∆ W − 1) blocking pairs, proving the theorem.
SMC with Bounded Number of Distinguished Persons or Blocking Pairs
In Proof. We present a reduction based on the one from Multicolored Clique given in the proof of Theorem 2. Given some graph G and an integer k as inputs, we are going to re-use the instance I constructed in the proof of Theorem 2. Recall that I has a feasible matching with at most b = k 2 + 2k blocking pairs exactly if G has a clique of size k. Recall also that the set of women that must be covered in I is S ∪ T ∪ U ; here we denote this set by W ⋆ I . We define 
We also add the distinguished woman s, who must be covered in I ′ , and the unique man t in L(s). See Fig. 3 for an illustration.
Let n(w) denote the unique man acceptable for some w ∈ W ⋆ I in I. Additionally, we let Y = {a w , c w | w ∈ W ⋆ I }, and we write [Y ] for an arbitrarily fixed ordering of the elements of Y . The preferences of the newly introduced men and women, as well as the modified preferences of those agents that find them acceptable, is given below. Here, again, indices take all possible values, and w can be any woman in W ⋆ I . We let I ′ contain all other women and men defined in I, having the same preferences as in I.
. We will show that I ′ has a feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs if and only if I has such a matching; this clearly proves the theorem.
First observe that any feasible matching M ′ for I ′ contains the edge {s, t}. Thus, if some woman y in Y is not matched by M ′ to her first choice, then {y, t} is blocking in M ′ . Consider now F w for some w ∈ W ⋆ I . It is straightforward to check that if M ′ (w) = n(w), then there are at least two blocking pairs incident to a woman in F w . Indeed, assume first that {t, a w } is the only blocking pair in F w ; this quickly implies M ′ (c w ) = d ′ w and M ′ (b ′ w ) = w, which in turn leads to {a w , b ′ w } blocking M ′ , a contradiction. Second, assume that {t, a w } does not block M ′ ; from this follows M ′ (a w ) = b ′ w and we have that {b ′ w , w} is a blocking pair for M ′ . Now either {t, c w } is blocking (in which case our claim holds), or we get M ′ (c w ) = d ′ w , which implies that {d ′ w , s} blocks M ′ , again a contradiction. Now, let W i be the women in G i that must be covered in I, i.e., W i = {s i , t i , u 1 i , . . . , u b+1 i }. Consider the number β i of blocking pairs for M ′ that involve a woman either in the gadget G i or in a gadget F w for some w ∈ W i . On the one hand, if some w ∈ W i is not matched by M ′ to n(w), then β i ≥ 2 because of the blocking pairs in F w . On the other hand, if each w ∈ W i is matched by M ′ to n(w), then using the arguments of the proof for Theorem 2, we again know β i ≥ 2 because of the blocking pairs in G i . Also, β i = 2 can only be achieved if (i) M ′ (t i ) = n(t i ), as otherwise {t i , n(t i )} would be blocking for M ′ , in addition to the two blocking pairs in F t i , and (ii) M ′ (u h i ) = n(u h i ) for each h ∈ {1, . . . , b + 1}, as otherwise we would have M ′ (s i ) = n(s i ) (so as to avoid having four blocking pairs due to women in F u h i and F s i ), implying at least one blocking pair in G i in addition to those in F u h i . Analogously, let β i,j denote the number of blocking pairs for M ′ that involve a woman either in the gadget G {i,j} or in a gadget F w for some w ∈ {s i,j , t i,j }. Then either β i,j ≥ 2, or we know that M ′ (w) = n(w) for both women w ∈ {s i,j , t i,j }; in this case, from the proof of Theorem 2 we get β i,j ≥ 1. However, supposing that M ′ has at most b = 2k + k 2 blocking pairs, it follows that β i = 2 and β i,j = 1 must hold for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and each i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k, respectively.
Along the same lines as in the proof of Theorem 2, it can also be verified that β i,j = 1 for each pair of indices i, j can only be achieved if M ′ △M s contains a path in each gadget G i . From M ′ (w) = n(w) for each w ∈ W i \ {s i } we get that such a path contains at least one blocking pair. This implies M ′ (s i ) = n(s i ), as otherwise we would end up with β i ≥ 3 because of the blocking pairs incident to women of F s i .
Altogether, we have proved that M ′ (w) = n(w) for each w ∈ W ⋆ I . Hence, the restriction of M ′ to I yields a feasible matching for I that admits at most b blocking pairs.
For the other direction, suppose that I has a feasible matching M . Then it is easy to see that adding the edges {a w , b ′ w }, {b w , c ′ w }, {c w , d ′ w }, and {d w , a ′ w } for each w ∈ W ⋆ I together with the edge {s, t} to M yields a feasible matching for I ′ that contains exactly the same number of blocking pairs in I ′ as M does in I. Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Theorem 5, so we will only sketch it. Again, we are going to re-use the instance I constructed in the proof of Theorem 
Again, we denote the set of women to be covered in I by W ⋆ I , and we denote by n(w) the unique man acceptable for some w ∈ W ⋆ I in I. The preferences of the newly introduced men and women, as well as the modified preferences of those agents that find them acceptable, is given below (here, [W ⋆ I ] ≺ denotes the ordering of W ⋆ I given by the master list). We let I ′ contain all other women and men defined in I, having the same preferences as in I.
∀w ∈ W ⋆ I . Arguing analogously as before in the proof of Theorem 5, one can show that I ′ has a feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs if and only if I has such a matching; this suffices to prove the theorem.
To contrast our intractability results, we show next that if each of |W ⋆ |, |M ⋆ |, ∆ W , and ∆ M is constant, then SMC becomes polynomial-time solvable. Our algorithm relies on the observation that in this case, the number of blocking pairs in an optimal solution is at most 
SMC with Preference Lists of Length at most Two
In this section we investigate the computational complexity of SMC where the maximum length of preference lists is bounded by 2 on one side. This restriction leads to important tractable special cases: we obtain both polynomial-time algorithms and fixed-parameter tractability results for various parameterizations.
Let I be an instance of SMC with underlying graph G. Let M s be a stable matching in I, and let M ⋆ 0 and W ⋆ 0 denote the set of distinguished men and women, respectively, unmatched by M s . Furthermore, let M 0 and W 0 denote the set of all men and women, respectively, unmatched by M s . A path P in G is called an augmenting path, if M s ∆P is a matching, and either both endpoints of P are in M ⋆ 0 ∪ W ⋆ 0 , or one endpoint of P is in M ⋆ 0 ∪ W ⋆ 0 , and its other endpoint is not distinguished. We will call an augmenting path P masculine or feminine if it contains a man in M ⋆ 0 or a woman in W ⋆ 0 , respectively; if P is both masculine and feminine, then we call it neutral. If P is not neutral, then we say that it starts at the (unique) person from M ⋆ 0 ∪ W ⋆ 0 it contains, and ends at its other endpoint.
Covering constraints on one side
Here we deal with the SMC-1 problem where only women need to be covered. We first give a polynomial-time algorithm for SMC-1 when each man finds at most two women acceptable, and then show NP-hardness of SMC-1 for instances where each woman finds at most two men acceptable. We start by considering the special case of SMC-1 where ∆ M ≤ 2.
Theorem 8.
There is a polynomial-time algorithm for the special case of SMC-1 where each man finds at most two women acceptable.
High-level description. The main observation behind Theorem 8 is that if ∆ M ≤ 2, then any two augmenting paths starting from different women in W ⋆ 0 are almost disjoint, namely they can only intersect at their endpoints. Thus, we can modify the stable matching M s by selecting augmenting paths starting from each woman in W ⋆ 0 in an almost independent fashion: intuitively, we simply need to take care not to choose paths sharing an endpoint-a task which can be managed by finding a bipartite matching in an appropriately defined auxiliary graph. To ensure that the number of blocking pairs in the output is minimized, we will assign costs to the augmenting paths. Roughly speaking, the cost of an augmenting path P determines the number of blocking pairs introduced when modifying M s along P (though certain special edges need not be counted); hence, our problem reduces to finding a bipartite matching with minimum weight in the auxiliary graph.
To present the algorithm of Theorem 8 in detail, we start with the following properties of augmenting paths which are easy to prove using that ∆ M ≤ 2: Proposition 1. Let P 1 and P 2 be augmenting paths starting at w 1 and w 2 , respectively.
(a) If w 1 = w 2 , then P 1 and P 2 are either vertex-disjoint, or they both end at some m ∈ M 0 , with V (P 1 ) ∩ V (P 2 ) = {m}.
(b) If there is an edge {m, w} of G (with m ∈ M and w ∈ W) connecting P 1 and P 2 , then m ∈ M 0 and P 1 or P 2 must end at m.
(c) If w 1 = w 2 and P is the maximal common subpath of P 1 and P 2 starting at w 1 , then either V (P 1 ) ∩ V (P 2 ) = V (P ), or P 1 and P 2 both end at some m ∈ M 0 and V (P 1 ) ∩ V (P 2 ) = V (P ) ∪ {m}.
With a set P of edges (typically a set of augmenting paths) where M s △P is a matching, we associate a cost, which is the number of blocking pairs that M s △P admits. A pair {m, w} for some m ∈ M and w ∈ W is special, if m ∈ M 0 and w is the second (less preferred) woman in L(m). As it turns out, such edges can be ignored during certain steps of the algorithm; thus, we define the special cost of P as the number of non-special blocking pairs in M s △P . Lemma 1. For vertex-disjoint augmenting paths P 1 and P 2 with costs c 1 and c 2 , resp., the cost of P 1 ∪ P 2 is at most c 1 + c 2 . Further, if the cost of P 1 ∪ P 2 is less than c 1 + c 2 , then the following holds for {i 1 , i 2 } = {1, 2}: there is a special edge {m, w} with P i 1 ending at m and w appearing on P i 2 ; moreover, {m, w} is blocking in M s △P i 2 , but not in M s △(P 1 ∪ P 2 ).
Proof. First observe that if some edge {m, w} has a common vertex with only one of the paths P 1 and P 2 , say P 1 , then {m, w} is blocking in M s △P 1 if and only if it is blocking in M s △(P 1 ∪ P 2 ).
Consider now the case when {m, w} connects P 1 and P 2 . By Proposition 1, this implies that one of the paths, say P 1 , ends at m ∈ M 0 (and w lies on P 2 ). Clearly, {m, w} is not blocking in M s △P 1 , by the stability of M s . If, on the one hand, w is the first choice of m, then {m, w} is blocking in M s △P 2 exactly if it is blocking in M s △(P 1 ∪ P 2 ). If, on the other hand, {m, w} is special, then it cannot be blocking in M s △(P 1 ∪ P 2 ), but it might be blocking in M s △P 2 . Putting all these facts together, the lemma follows immediately.
We are ready to provide the algorithm, in a sequence of four steps.
Step 1: Computing all augmenting paths. By Proposition 1, if we delete M 0 from the union of all augmenting paths starting at some w ∈ W ⋆ 0 , then we obtain a tree. Furthermore, these trees are mutually vertex-disjoint for different starting vertices of W ⋆ 0 . This allows us to compute all augmenting paths in linear time, e.g., by an appropriately modified version of the DFS algorithm (so that only augmenting paths are considered). During this process, we can also compute the special cost of each augmenting path in a straightforward way.
Step 2: Constructing an auxiliary graph. Using the results of the computation of Step 1, we construct an edge-weighted single bipartite graph G path as follows. The vertex set of G path is the union of W ⋆ 0 and M 0 ∪{w ′ | w ∈ W ⋆ 0 }, so for each woman w ∈ W ⋆ 0 we create a corresponding new vertex w ′ . We add an edge between w ∈ W ⋆ 0 and m ∈ M 0 with weight c if there exists an augmenting path with endpoints w and m having special cost c (and no such path with lower special cost exists). Further, for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 we compute the minimum special cost c min w of any augmenting path starting at w and not ending in M 0 , and add an edge between w and w ′ with weight c min w in G path .
Step 3: Computing a minimum weight matching. We compute a matching M P in G path covering W ⋆ 0 and having minimum weight. Observe that such a matching corresponds to a set of augmenting paths P = {P w | w ∈ W ⋆ 0 } that are mutually vertex-disjoint by Proposition 1. Recall that the special cost of P w is the weight of the edge in M P incident to w.
Step 4: Eliminating blocking special edges. In this step, we modify P iteratively. We start by setting P act = P. At each iteration we modify P act as follows. We check whether there exists a special edge {m * , w * } that is blocking in M s △P act . If yes, then notice that m * is not matched in M s △P act , because {m * , w * } is special and thus m * ∈ M 0 . Let P be the path of P act containing w * . We modify P act by truncating P to its subpath between its starting vertex and w * , and appending to it the edge {m * , w * }. This way, {m * , w * } becomes an edge of the matching M s △P act . The iteration stops when there is no special edge blocking M s △P act . Note that once a special edge ceases to be blocking in M s △P act , it cannot become blocking again during this process, so the algorithm performs at most |M 0 | iterations. For each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 , let P * w denote the augmenting path in P act covering w at the end of Step 4; we define P * = {P * w | w ∈ W ⋆ 0 } and output the matching M s △P * . This completes the description of the algorithm; we now provide its analysis. Lemma 2. M sol := M s △P * is a feasible matching for I, and the number of blocking pairs for M sol is at most the weight of M P .
Proof. Consider the situation when the iteration in Step 4 deals with a special edge {m * , w * } blocking in P act . Notice that since w * is the second woman in L(m * ) (by the definition of a special edge), and since {w * , m * } is blocking in M s △P act , we know that m * is unmatched in M s △P act , that is, m * does not lie on any of the augmenting paths in P act . From this follows that the augmenting paths in P act , and hence in P * , remain mutually vertex-disjoint. Therefore, M sol is indeed a matching. As it covers W ⋆ 0 , and no augmenting path ends at a woman in
Clearly, Step 4 ensures that there are no blocking special edges in M sol . Note that when the algorithm modifies P w for some w ∈ W ⋆ 0 , at most one new blocking pair may arise with respect to M s △P act , and from the stability of M and Proposition 1 it follows that such an edge must be a special edge (incident to the man at which P w ends before its modification). This means that Step 4 gets rid of all blocking special edges without introducing any non-special blocking edges. Hence, we obtain that the cost of P * w is at most the special cost of P w , for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 . By Lemma 1, the number of blocking pairs that M sol admits is at most the sum of the costs of all augmenting paths in P * ; this finishes the proof.
To show that our algorithm is correct and M sol is optimal, by Lemma 2 it suffices to prove that the weight of M P is at most the number of blocking pairs in M opt , where M opt denotes an optimal solution in I. To this end, we are going to define a matching covering W ⋆ 0 in G path whose weight is at most the number of blocking pairs in M opt .
Clearly, M s △M opt contains an augmenting path Q w covering w for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 . If some Q w ends at a man m ∈ M 0 , then clearly no other path in M s △M opt can end at m. So let us take the matching M Q in G path that includes all pairs {m, w} where Q w ends at m ∈ M 0 for some w ∈ W ⋆ 0 . Also, we put {w, w ′ } into M Q if Q w does not end at a man of M 0 . Note that M Q is indeed a matching.
It remains to show that the weight of M Q is at most the number of blocking pairs in M opt . By definition, the weight of M Q is at most the sum of the special costs of the paths Q w for every w ∈ W ⋆ 0 . By Lemma 1, any non-special blocking pair in M s △Q w remains a blocking pair in M s △( w∈W ⋆ 0 Q w ), and hence in M opt as well. Hence, there is a matching in G path with weight at most the number of blocking pairs in an optimal solution, implying the correctness of our algorithm. As the algorithm runs in polynomial time, Theorem 8 follows.
By contrast to Theorem 8, if men may have preference lists of length 3, then SMC-1 (and hence SMC) is NP-hard even if each woman finds at most two men acceptable. Proof. We give a reduction from the NP-hard Vertex Cover problem, asking whether the input graph G has a vertex cover of size at most k. We order the vertices of G arbitrarily, and denote the h-th neighbor of some vertex x by n(x, h) for any h ∈ {1, . . . , d(x)}.
Let us construct an instance I of SMC as follows; see Fig. 4 for an illustration. For each vertex x ∈ V (G) we construct a node gadget G x which contains women s x , a 0 x , . . . , a x , and d x . For each edge {x, y} ∈ E(G) we also construct an edge gadget G {x,y} involving women s {x,y} , a x→y and a y→x , and men b x→y and b y→x . Furthermore, there are two edges in the underlying graph connecting G {x,y} to G x and G y , namely {a x→y , b h x } and {a y→x , b ℓ y } where y = n(x, h) and x = n(y, ℓ). The preference lists of I are given in Table 4 . We define the set of women with covering constraints as
and set the number of blocking pairs allowed to be |V (G)| + k.
We are going to prove that I admits a feasible matching with at most |V (G)| + k blocking pairs if and only if there is a vertex cover of size k in the graph G.
"⇒": Let M be a feasible matching with at most |V (G)| + k blocking pairs. We say that the cost of some gadget G x (or G {x,y} ) is the number of edges blocking M which are incident to some man of G x (or G {x,y} , respectively.) We will prove that the set S of vertices x for which G x has cost at least 2 is a vertex cover of G.
First, let us consider some x for which M (s x ) = d x . In this case, both c 1 x and c 2 x form a blocking pair for M with d x , implying x ∈ S. Second, let us consider some x with M (s x ) = b 0
x . Since each a h x with 0 ≤ h < d(x) must be matched by M , we obtain M (a h x ) = b h+1
form a blocking pair for M . Moreover, if the woman a x→y is unmatched in M for some y, then {a x→y , b h x } is also a blocking pair in M (where y = n(x, h)), and implies a cost of at least 2 for G x . Therefore, we can observe that if x / ∈ S, then a x→y must be matched by M to b x→y for each neighbor y of x in G.
However, for any {x, y} ∈ E(G), M must match s {x,y} either to b x→y or to b y→x , which means that x ∈ S or y ∈ S. This proves that S is indeed a vertex cover for G. Moreover, the number of vertices in S can be at most k, since each G x with x ∈ S has cost at least 2, each G x with x / ∈ S has cost at least 1, and the total cost of all gadgets cannot exceed our budget |V (G)| + k.
"⇐": Given a vertex cover S of size at most k for G, we define a matching M with the desired properties. Namely, for each x ∈ S we set M (s x ) = d x and M (a h x ) = b h x for each 
where y = n(x, h).
h ∈ {0, . . . , d(x)}. In this case, c 1 x , c 2 x are unmatched by M , both forming a blocking pair with d x . By contrast, all of the men b 0 x , . . . , b
is unmatched by M , and thus forms a blocking pair with b
x . Observe also that d x is not contained in any blocking pair. Finally, for some {x, y} ∈ E(G), let us assume y ∈ S (since S is a vertex cover, it contains x or y). We set M (s {x,y} ) = b y→x and M (a x→y ) = b x→y . Note that a x→y gets her first choice, so it cannot be involved in a blocking pair. Although a y→x is unmatched by M , we know that it cannot form a blocking pair with b ℓ y where x = n(y, ℓ), because y ∈ S and hence b ℓ y is assigned her first choice by M . Thus, no man or woman of some edge gadget participates in a blocking pair, and therefore we obtain that the total number of blocking pairs for M is exactly |V (G)|+k.
Since M is feasible, the theorem follows.
Covering constraints on both sides
Let us now investigate the complexity of SMC with covering constraints both for men and women. If we restrict the maximum length of preference lists on both sides to be at most 2, SMC becomes linear-time solvable; this follows from the observation that by max(∆ W , ∆ M ) ≤ 2, the graph underlying the instance is a collection of paths and cycles.
Observation 2. Instances of SMC with max(∆
Recall that the case where ∆ W = 2 and ∆ M = 3 is NP-hard by Theorem 9, even if there are no distinguished men to be covered. However, switching the role of men and women, Theorem 8 shows that if there are no women to be covered, then ∆ W ≤ 2 guarantees polynomial-time solvability for SMC. This raises the natural question whether SMC with ∆ W ≤ 2 can be solved efficiently if the number of distinguished women is bounded. Next we show that this is unlikely, as the problem turns out to be NP-hard for |W ⋆ | = 1. Proof. We present a reduction from the following special case of Exact-3-Cover. We are given a set U = {u 1 , . . . , u n }, a family S of subsets S 1 , . . . , S m of U , each having size 3, such Table 5 : Preference lists of women and men in the proof of Theorem 10. We denote by ind(j, h) the index i for which u i is the h-th element in S j . When not stated otherwise, indices take all possible values.
] is some fixed ordering of B i .
that each element of U occurs in at most three sets of S. The task is to decide whether there exists a collection of n/3 sets in S whose union covers U ; such a collection of subsets is called an exact cover for U . This problem is NP-complete [20, GT2] . We construct an equivalent instance I of SMC as follows. The set W of women in I contains the women s j , p 1 j , p 2 j , p 3 j , and q j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, women x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x m , and two women a i,j , b i,j for each element u i contained in S j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}. The men defined in I arex j ,p 1 j ,p 2 j ,p 3 j ,q j , and t j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, a man c i for each u i ∈ U , a manb i,j for each element u i contained in S j for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, plus one additional man y. (The pairs {w,ŵ} form a stable matching in I.) The only distinguished woman in I is x 0 , and the set of distinguished men is M ⋆ = {c i | i = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {x j , t j | j = 1, . . . , m} ∪ {y}. The preferences of each person are as shown in Table 5 . Note that since each subset S j contains three elements, and each element u i is contained in at most three subsets from S, the constructed instance satisfies ∆ M ≤ 3. To finish the construction, we set the number of allowed blocking pairs to be b = 2m + 2n/3 + 1.
We claim that I admits a feasible matching with at most b blocking pairs if and only if (U, S) is a "yes"-instance of Exact-3-Cover.
"⇒": Suppose M is a feasible matching for I with at most b blocking pairs. First, observe that since everyx j , j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, but also x 0 is distinguished, M must contain the edges {x j ,x j+1 } for each j ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} as well as the edge {x m , y}. Thus, {x m ,x m } is blocking in M . Second, since t j is distinguished for each j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we get that M matches t j either to q j or to p 1 j , which in turn implies that either {q j ,q j } or {p 1 j ,p 1 j } blocks M , leading to m additional blocking pairs for M . Third, consider now any man c i , i ∈ {1, . . . , n}: as c i is distinguished, we know M (c i ) = b i,j for some j such that S j contains u i . In this case, {b i,j ,b i,j } is also a blocking pair for M , yielding n blocking pairs of such form. Thus, if b U denotes the number of blocking pairs among the edges {b i,j ,b i,j } for indices i and j with u i ∈ S j , then we get b U ≥ n.
Let us define now the set E j of those edges that are incident to s j ,p 3 j , p 3 j ,p 2 j , or p 2 j for some j ∈ {1, . . . , m}; note that these sets are pairwise disjoint, and none of them contains any of the (possibly) blocking edges mentioned in the previous paragraph. Let k be the number of indices j for which E j contains no blocking pairs for M ; we call such indices (and the subsets S j corresponding to them) selected. The m − k non-selected indices clearly correspond to at least m − k blocking pairs for M (each contained in E j for some j).
Suppose now that j is selected. Then, since {s j ,x j } is not blocking, we get M (s j ) =p 3 j . This shows that M (p 3 j ) =p 2 j , as otherwise {p 3 j ,p 3 j } would be blocking in M . Similarly, from this we obtain M (p 2 j ) =p 1 j . Moreover, for each h ∈ {1, 2, 3}, to ensure that {p h j , a i,j } does not block M where u i is the h-th element of S j , we must have M (a i,j ) =b i,j . This implies that {b i,j ,b i,j } must be blocking in M . Since this holds for each h ∈ {1, 2, 3} and each selected j, we get b U ≥ 3k.
Summing up the blocking pairs identified so far, we know that M admits at least 1 + m + (m − k) + max(n, 3k) blocking pairs. Using that this must be upper-bounded by b = 1 + m + n + (m − n/3), it is easy to show that only k = n/3 is possible. This yields that there exist exactly n/3 selected indices, and for all such indices j all the edges {b i,j ,b i,j } for which u i ∈ S j are blocking w.r.t. M . Moreover, we also must have b U = n, as otherwise the number of blocking pairs would exceed b.
However, observe that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there must exist some j with u i ∈ S j for which the pair {b i,j ,b i,j } is blocking in M (because u i is distinguished), implying that for each u i ∈ U there must exist some selected S j that contains u i . Since there are exactly n/3 selected sets in S, we get that they form an exact covering of U .
"⇐": Suppose that (U, S) is a "yes"-instance of Exact-3-Cover. Let J be the set of indices describing a solution, meaning that the subsets S j ∈ S with j ∈ J form an exact covering of U ; clearly, |J| = n/3. We define σ(i) as the unique index j in J for which u i ∈ S j . We define a feasible matching M for I with exactly b blocking pairs as follows (indices take all possible values, if not stated otherwise).
It is easy to check that M indeed is feasible, and the blocking pairs it admits are exactly the pairs {x m ,x m }, {b i,σ(i) ,b i,σ(i) } for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, {p 1 j ,p 1 j } for each j ∈ J, {q 1 j ,q 1 j } for each j / ∈ J, and {s j ,x j } for each j / ∈ J. This proves the lemma.
Contrasting Theorem 10, we establish fixed-parameter tractability of the case ∆ W ≤ 2 with two different parameterizations. Considering our five parameters, the relevant cases (whose tractability or intractability does not follow from our results obtained so far) are as follows (assuming ∆ W ≤ 2 throughout). First, we can take the number of distinguished persons as parameter (note that we know NP-hardness of the cases where |W ⋆ | = 1 or |M ⋆ | = 0). Second, we can consider the number of blocking pairs as the parameter. We show fixed-parameter tractability for both parameterizations.
Theorem 11. There is a fixed-parameter algorithm for the special case of SMC where each woman finds at most two men acceptable (i.e., ∆ W ≤ 2), with parameter the number |W ⋆ 0 |+|M ⋆ 0 | of distinguished men and women left unmatched by some stable matching.
High-level description. Let us remark first that simply guessing the optimal partners for each man in M ⋆ 0 and then using the polynomial algorithm presented in Section 6.1 does not work, since that algorithm heavily relies on the assumption that we start with a stable matching. In fact, the main difficulty to overcome is that feminine and masculine augmenting paths may "interact" in the sense that certain blocking pairs introduced by a feminine augmenting path can be "eliminated" (i.e., made non-blocking again) by an appropriately chosen masculine path. Therefore, we apply the following strategy. In Phase I, we find all feminine paths (as well as cycles) in M s △M opt , and in Phase II we proceed with choosing the masculine paths carefully. Note that in Phase I it does not suffice to find a cheapest set of feminine augmenting paths, since we may not be able to eliminate as many blocking pairs afterwards as is it possible after an optimal choice of feminine paths. Instead, we need to find the exact feminine augmenting paths (and cycles) present in M s △M opt ; this can be accomplished by guessing certain properties of M opt .
In Phase II, the main obstacle is that we do not know which blocking edges should be eliminated in an optimal solution, nor can we guess these edges efficiently. We deal with this problem by guessing the sets of those men in M ⋆ 0 whose augmenting paths in M s △M opt contribute to the elimination of a blocking pair; this information allows us to find these masculine paths. Finally, we apply the algorithm of Theorem 8.
For the detailed description of our algorithm, we need a couple of simple observations and some additional notation. We begin with the following implications of the fact that each woman finds at most two men acceptable.
Proposition 2. Let P 1 and P 2 be two augmenting paths.
(a) If P 1 and P 2 start at some w ∈ W ⋆ 0 through the same edge, then one of them is a subpath of the other.
(b) If P 1 and P 2 start at different women w 1 and w 2 , resp., and P 1 and P 2 are not disjoint, then the set of their common vertices induces a suffix of either P 1 or P 2 (or both); their first common vertex is a man.
(c) If P 1 and P 2 are disjoint and e is an edge incident to both, then one of the paths starts or ends at a women w, and e connects w with a man on the other path.
Let M opt denote an optimal solution for our instance I such that M s △M opt contains the minimum number of edges; recall that M s is a fixed stable matching for I. Let b be the number of blocking pairs in M opt .
We say that an edge f = {m, w} of G (with m ∈ M and w ∈ W) is dependent if it connects two different connected components K 1 and K 2 of M s △M opt and, in addition, it holds that M s △K 1 admits more blocking pairs than M s △(K 1 ∪ K 2 ). We will say that f , and with a slight abuse of the notation, also K 1 relies on K 2 . By claim (c) of Proposition 2, this is only possible in the following two scenarios, depicted in Fig. 5: • f has type A: w is the endpoint of K 2 (which must be a path), f connects w with a man m on K 1 that prefers M s (m) to w, and w to M opt (m), and w is unmatched by M s and prefers M opt (w) to m;
• f has type B : w is the endpoint of K 1 (which must be a path), unmatched by M opt , and f connects w with a man m on K 2 that prefers M opt (m) to w, and w to M s (m).
type A:
. . We are now ready to present our algorithm, which is a branching algorithm: throughout its course, we make several "guesses" for which all possibilities have to be explored. When certain guesses turn out to be trivially wrong, such guesses are discarded, and we might not explicitly mention this in the algorithm. (In Step 1, we describe such issues in detail for illustration, but later we omit them.) Phase I and II consist of Steps 1-5 and Steps 6-8, resp.
Step 1: Guessing the first edges of augmenting paths. First, for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 with |L(w)| = 2, we guess the edge of M opt incident to w. This results in at most 2 |W ⋆ 0 | possibilities, all of which must be explored. Naturally, we discard those guesses where the edges {w, M opt (w)}, w ∈ W ⋆ 0 , do not form a matching. From now on we assume that we know M opt (w) for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 . Additionally, we delete those edges {m, w} for which w ∈ W ⋆ 0 and w prefers M opt (w) to m. Such edges are neither needed in M opt , nor can they block any matching that contains all the edges {w, M opt (w)}, w ∈ W ⋆ 0 , guessed in this step. Before proceeding to Step 2, we state an important lemma about augmenting paths.
Lemma 3. All maximal paths in M s △M opt are augmenting paths. Further, assume that Step 1 has already been performed, and K 1 and K 2 are connected components of M s △M opt such that K 1 relies on K 2 via a dependent edge f . Then (a) if f has type A, then K 2 is a masculine path and not a feminine path; (b) if f has type B, then K 1 is a feminine path, and K 2 is either a cycle or a feminine path.
Proof. For contradiction, let us first suppose that Q is a maximal path in M s △M opt that is not an augmenting path. The feasibility of M opt implies that if Q has a distinguished person p as its endpoint, then p must be unmatched by M s . This means that Q can only be non-augmenting if neither of its endpoints is distinguished. This implies that M Q := M opt △Q is a feasible matching. Recall that b is the number of blocking pairs M opt admits. If M Q admits at most b blocking pairs as well, then this contradicts to the choice of M opt , because there are strictly less edges in M s △M Q than in M s △M opt .
Hence, M opt △Q admits at least b + 1 blocking pairs. It is easy to see that since M s is stable and Q is a path, there must be an edge along Q that blocks M opt . By contrast, there is no edge on Q that blocks M s , since M s is stable. Hence, modifying M opt by switching the edges of M s and M opt along Q can only increase the number of blocking pairs if there are at least two dependent edges relying on Q. Clearly, one of these must have type B.
Let us call the man endpoint of a type B dependent edge a joiner ; by the previous paragraph, Q contains at least one joiner. Let us fix an "outer-most" joiner m on Q. More precisely, we choose m so that the following holds: if m splits Q into two subpaths Q 1 and Q 2 with Q 1 containing M opt (m), then Q 1 contains no other joiners. Now, there might be several women who form a dependent edge with m, so let w denote the one that is most preferred by m. Let f be the edge {m, w}, and let P be the path of M s △M opt that has w as its endpoint. We illustrate these concepts in We
is an optimal solution. Observe that M s △M f can be obtained from M s △M opt by deleting Q and substituting P by the path P + f + Q 2 (where the plus sign means concatenation). Let x denote the endpoint of Q 1 that is not m. First, M f is clearly feasible, since x is not in W ⋆ 0 . Next, observe that by the stability of M s , the only edge that may become blocking in M f (and is not blocking in M opt ) is a possible dependent edge of type A incident to x. If indeed there exists such an edge, then x must be a woman not covered by M s . Moreover, since f is a dependent edge of type B, we know that m prefers y = M opt (m) to M s (m), and hence, y must prefer M s (y) to m. However, it is then straightforward to check that Q 1 must contain at least one edge that blocks M opt , and this edge clearly is not blocking in M f . (Note also the implication that Q 1 has at least two edges.) Thus, the number of edges blocking M f cannot be more than b. Hence, M f is an optimal solution such that there are less edges in M s △M f than in M s △M opt , a contradiction. This proves the first statement of the lemma.
Let us prove (b) now. Suppose that K 1 and K 2 are two connected components of M s △M opt such that K 1 relies on K 2 via an edge f = {w, m} of type B. It is immediate that K 1 cannot be a masculine path, so by the first statement of the lemma, it is feminine. It remains to show that if K 2 is path, then it is feminine. Assume for contradiction that K 2 is a non-feminine path Q in M s △M opt and some other path P in M s △M opt relies on Q via a type B edge f . In this case we can argue exactly as above to show that there must exist an optimal matching M f (defined the same way as we did while proving the first statement of the lemma) for which M s △M f contains less edges than M s △M opt , a contradiction.
To show (a), suppose that K 1 and K 2 are two connected components of M s △M opt such that K 1 relies on K 2 via an edge f = {w, m} of type A. By the definition of a type A edge, the woman endpoint w of f is unmatched in M s , and K 2 is a path that has w as an endpoint. Also, m is the second choice of w and M opt (w) is the first choice of w. Hence w ∈ W ⋆ 0 is w M opt (w)
. . . Step 2 of the algorithm for Theorem 11, for finding cycles in M △M opt . not possible, as in that case the edge f would have been deleted in Step 1 of the algorithm. Furthermore, since K 2 is an M s -alternating path with an endpoint in W 0 , the other endpoint of K 2 cannot be a woman in W 0 . Hence, Q 2 is not a feminine augmenting path. Since we already know that K 2 is an augmenting path, (a) follows.
By Lemma 3, each maximal path in M s △M opt is an augmenting path; we let P opt x denote the augmenting path in M s △M opt that contains some x ∈ W ⋆ 0 ∪ M ⋆ 0 as an endpoint.
Step 2: Finding cycles in M s △M opt . We make one more guess for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 by guessing whether P opt w relies on some cycle of M s △M opt or not. If P opt w relies on some cycle C, then by Proposition 2, both P opt w and C can be found in time O(|P opt w | + |C|) by simply following the longest alternating path starting with the edge {w, M opt (w)}: the last person on this path Q must be a woman x incident to an edge {x, m} for which m is on Q, and the subpath of Q between m and x together with the edge {x, m} form the cycle C. For an illustration, see Fig. 7 .
By the choice of M opt , any cycle in M s △M opt must be incident to at least one dependent edge of type B, relying on the cycle (recall that dependent edges of type A rely on paths). Furthermore, by Lemma 3 we also know that all paths relying on a cycle must be feminine paths. Hence, all cycles in M s △M opt and all paths relying on them are found in this step.
Step 3: Finding neutral paths. In this step, for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 we guess whether w lies on a neutral path in M s △M opt . Clearly, if w lies on a neutral path, then P opt w must be the unique longest augmenting path starting with the edge {w, M opt (w)} by Proposition 2.
Step 4: Finding feminine paths relying on other feminine paths. In this step, we first guess for each w ∈ W ⋆ 0 whether P opt w relies on another feminine path, and if so, we also guess on which one. Supposing that, according to our guesses, P opt w relies on P opt y for some w and y in W ⋆ 0 , we can find P indeed contains the man m incident to f , we store m as an obligatory man for y.
Step 5: Finding all remaining feminine paths. Let W r be the set of those women w ∈ W ⋆ 0 for which P opt w has not been found yet. For each w ∈ W r we define two paths. First, we let Q 1 w be the shortest augmenting path starting with the edge {w, M opt (w)} that contains all obligatory men for w. Second, let Q 2 w be the shortest augmenting path containing Q 1 w such that M s △Q 2 w admits less blocking pairs than M s △Q 1 w . must end at some woman w ′ in W 0 and f ′ must be a volatile edge incident to w ′ . Let us call this modification the filtering of f ; observe that the modified matching admits at most as many blocking pairs as M opt .
Let us repeat the above procedure until it is no longer applicable: while there exists a volatile edge e that is blocking in the actual matching M but was not blocking in M opt (there can be only one such e), filter e if it is incident to a non-feminine masculine path in M s △M , and stop otherwise. Clearly, this process terminates (as at each step we either make a masculine paths shorter, or match its last man with a better partner). In the end, we clearly arrive at an optimal matching that has either more common edges with M s than M opt , or in which all men are as happy as in M opt , both cases contradicting our choice of M opt .
For any volatile edge f , we can decide in linear time if there exists a masculine augmenting path disjoint from F that contains the woman endpoint of f but does not contain f itself. If such a path exists, then it is unique by Proposition 1 and we denote it by Q f . Let f be a volatile edge that is blocking in M s △F. We say that a set P f of masculine augmenting paths eliminates f if (i) Q f exists and Q f ∈ P f , and (ii) for any path Q ∈ P f , if there is a volatile blocking edge f ′ in M s △Q, then Q f ′ exists and is contained in P f . We refer to the (inclusionwise) minimal set of masculine paths eliminating f as the elimination paths for f , and denote it by P elim f . Further, we refer to the starting vertices of these paths as the elimination set for f .
Step 7: Guessing relevant elimination sets in M opt . We call an edge relevant in M opt , if it is a volatile edge blocking M s △F, but it does not block M opt . By Lemma 5 and the definition of elimination sets, we know that if f is a relevant edge in M opt , then M s △M opt must contain all paths in P elim f , to ensure that there are no volatile edges incident to masculine paths that block M opt . Since there may be several volatile edges blocking in M s △F, we cannot determine the relevant ones among them by simply guessing them. Instead, we only guess the elimination sets for all relevant edges. Clearly, these sets must be pairwise disjoint subsets of M ⋆ 0 , let R 1 , . . . , R ℓ denote them.
Step 8: Computing cheapest masculine paths. First, for each set R i ⊆ M ⋆ 0 with i = 1, . . . , ℓ that, according to our guesses made in Step 7, forms the elimination set for some volatile edge f relevant in M opt , we determine some volatile edge f incident to F that is blocking in M s △F and whose elimination set is exactly R i . Namely, we pick an edge f among all such edges in a way that the number of blocking pairs in M s △(F ∪ P elim f ) is as small as possible. Let f i be the volatile edge chosen this way, and let P elim = 1≤i≤ℓ P elim f i . Next, let M r = M ⋆ 0 \ (R 1 ∪ · · · ∪ R ℓ ) be the set of distinguished men that are neither covered by M s nor contained in any of the sets R 1 , . . . , R ℓ . It remains to determine an augmenting path for each m ∈ M r . Thus, for each such m we compute an augmenting path P m disjoint from F such that the number of blocking pairs in M s △P r is minimized, where P r is the union of all paths P m for some m ∈ M r . For this, we use the algorithm of Theorem 8 restricted to consider only masculine augmenting paths disjoint from F, and switching the roles of men and women.
Finally, we output the matching M out = M s △(F ∪ P elim ∪ P r ).
It is straightforward to verify that the number of guesses made are bounded by a function of |W ⋆ 0 | + |M ⋆ 0 |, and all computations in a branch can be performed in time polynomial in the size |I| of the instance, yielding a fixed-parameter algorithm. It remains to prove the correctness of the proposed algorithm.
Proof of Theorem 11. To prove the correctness of the proposed algorithm, we first show that if all our guesses are true, then the paths and cycles in F are exactly the feminine paths and the cycles of M s △M opt . From the description of our algorithm, it should be clear that the correctness of Steps 2, 3, and 4 follows directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma 3. Lemma 4 guarantees the correctness of Step 5, which proves that in Steps 1-5 the algorithm indeed finds all cycles and feminine paths of M s △M opt .
Next, let us argue that M out is indeed a matching. For this, apart from the correctness of Steps 1 to 5, we need that the masculine paths in M s △M out are disjoint from F. In addition, we also need that paths in P elim are disjoint from all remaining masculine paths. To see this, observe that each such path P ends at a woman w ∈ W 0 which is connected by a volatile edge (not on P ) to either F or to another path in P elim . Hence, w cannot lie on any masculine path other than P by Proposition 1. Thus, M out is a matching. Its feasibility is implied by the correctness of Steps 1 to 5, and the definition of augmenting paths.
It remains to argue that M out admits at most as many blocking pairs as M opt . First, observe that all edges blocking in M s △F are either relevant volatile edges in M opt , or they are also blocking in M opt . Assuming our guesses in Step 7 are correct, there are exactly ℓ relevant volatile edges in M opt . Furthermore, if e i is a relevant edge with elimination set R i for some i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, then by Lemma 5 we know that all elimination paths in P elim e i must be contained in M s △M opt . Hence, in Step 8 the algorithm is bound to find some volatile edge f i (though not necessarily e i ), that is blocking in M s △F and whose elimination set is R i . Clearly, by the definition of elimination paths, f i is not blocking in M out . Thus, there are at least ℓ volatile edges blocking in M s △F but not blocking in M out .
It remains to count the number of blocking pairs in M out adjacent only to masculine paths. First, by our choice of e i , there are at most as many blocking pairs in M out incident to paths in P elim f i , as there are in M opt incident to paths in P elim e i . Therefore, the number of blocking pairs in M s △(F ∪ P elim ) is at most the number of blocking pairs in M s △(F ∪ 1≤i≤ℓ P elim ) e i .
Second, as the algorithm of Theorem 8 is correct, the total number of blocking pairs in M s △P r is at most the number of blocking pairs in M opt incident to the paths P opt m , m ∈ M r . Observe that no augmenting path in M s △M opt that does not start in M r can rely on a path P opt m for some m ∈ M r , so we can indeed choose augmenting paths starting from the men in M r independently from the rest of the solution. The optimality of M out follows.
As each augmenting path contains at least one edge that blocks M opt , the number of blocking pairs admitted by M opt is at least (|W ⋆ 0 | + |M ⋆ 0 |)/2. Thus, we get Corollary 3.
Corollary 3.
There is a fixed-parameter algorithm with parameter b for the special case of SMC where each woman finds at most two men acceptable (i.e., ∆ W ≤ 2).
Discussion
We provided a systematic study of the computational complexity of Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints. Our main result is a complete computational complexity trichotomy into polynomial-time solvable cases, NP-hard and fixed-parameter tractable cases, and NP-hard and W[1]-hard cases, for all possible combinations of five natural parameters:
• |M ⋆ |: the number of distinguished men,
• |W ⋆ |: the number of distinguished women,
• ∆ M : the maximum length of preference lists for men,
• ∆ W : the maximum length of preference lists for women, and
• b: the number of blocking pairs allowed. Figure 8 : Decision diagram for determining the complexity of SMC. We remark that if a certain restriction of SMC where one of the values v ∈ S is a constant k proves to be NP-hard or W[1]-hard with some parameterization, then it is easy to see that the same hardness result also holds for the case where v ≥ k (and all other assumptions are the same). We refer to the "reflection" of a result by adding the postfix 'R' to its name (so Theorem xR denotes the reflection of Theorem x); here by reflection we mean the statement obtained by switching the roles of men and women.
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As a special case, we solved a problem by Hamada et al. [23] . Fig. 8 provides a decision diagram showing that our results indeed fully determine the computational complexity of SMC with respect to the set S = {b, |W ⋆ |, |M ⋆ |, ∆ M , ∆ W } of possible parameters. Going through this decision diagram should convince the reader that any parameterized restriction of SMC with respect to the set S is classified as either polynomial-time solvable (P) or NP-hard, and in the latter case, either fixed-parameter tractable (FPT), or W[1]-hard with the given parameterization (if any). In particular, when we provide parameterized results, this means that the parameterized restriction of SMC in question is NP-hard without parameterization.
Given the strong polynomial-time inapproximability bounds, as well as the parameterized intractability results of this paper, we pose as an open question whether fixed-parameter approximation algorithms can beat either of these obstacles for solving SMC.
Another challenge for future research is to investigate possible adaptations of the proposed algorithms to the Hospitals/Residents model (note that, naturally, all our hardness results for SMC-1 apply to the HRLQ problem), or to a setting where ties are allowed in the preference lists.
